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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Michael F. Urbanski *
James R. Creekmore **
Ellen S. Moore ***
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past two years, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the federal and state courts
of Virginia have dealt with myriad antitrust and trade regulation
issues. For the most part, courts in Virginia have continued their
long-standing hostility toward such claims, whether brought un-
der the cloak of the antitrust laws or common law business torts
affecting competition. For example, in Continental Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc.,1 the Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court's application of the quick-look analysis to determine
whether baggage templates at Washington Dulles International
Airport constituted restraints on trade, remanding the case with
instructions to apply a more rigorous modified quick-look analysis
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or a rule of reason analysis.2 Likewise, in Titan America, LLC v.
Riverton Investment Corp.,' the Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
missed the plaintiffs allegations of tortious interference with ex-
isting and potential economic relationships as barred by the No-
err-Pennington doctrine.4 In the context of Internet commerce,
however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia found the existence of an anticompetitive purpose in
Eurotech, Inc. v. Cosmos European Travels Aktiengesellschaft.5
This article discusses antitrust and trade regulation by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and federal
and state courts of Virginia over the past two years, as well as
new legislative developments in these fields.
II. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
A. Sherman and Telecommunications Acts: Two Parallel But
Independent Actions
In Cavalier Telephone, L.L.C. v. Verizon Virginia, Inc.,6 the
Fourth Circuit held that the special relationship between the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Sherman Act prevents a
complainant from using the Sherman Act to enforce the duties
imposed by the Telecommunications Act.7 The Telecommuni-
cations Act requires incumbent telecommunications carriers
("ILECs") to assist competitors in entering the market through
interconnection agreements, resale of service, and use of facili-
ties.8 Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act, Verizon Virginia
and Cavalier Telephone entered into an interconnection agree-
ment that made Verizon's lines and facilities available for use by
Cavalier.' After experiencing difficulty implementing the agree-
ment, Cavalier filed a claim against Verizon alleging that Verizon
erected obstacles to Cavalier's interconnection by blocking calls,
2. Id. See infra Part II.E for a full discussion of this case.
3. 264 Va. 292, 569 S.E.2d 57 (2002).
4. Id. See infra Part IV.A for a full discussion of this case.
5. 213 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627 (E.D. Va. 2001). See infra Part III.A.1 for a full discus-
sion of this case.
6. 330 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2003).
7. Id. at 188.
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); see also Cavalier Tel.,
330 F.3d at 179.
9. Cavalier Tel., 330 F.3d at 179.
[Vol. 38:59
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
using overly complex and expensive systems, and delaying com-
petitive entry.'" Cavalier contended that Verizon created the
complications to monopolize the relevant telecommunications
market, thereby violating section 2 of the Sherman Act."
The district court granted Verizon's motion to dismiss, finding
the complaint merely asserted violations of Verizon's duties un-
der the Telecommunications Act and did not assert violations of
the Sherman Act.12 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit assessed the
scope of both acts and their interrelation, concluding "that the
special, indeed idiosyncratic, relationship between the Telecom-
munications Act and the Sherman Act prevents the Sherman Act
from taking on the role of enforcing duties imposed for the first
time by the Telecommunications Act."13 The Telecommunications
Act was intended to preserve the roles of the antitrust laws as
they stood at the time of its ratification. 4 Thus, although the
Sherman and Telecommunications Acts operate in tandem, they
feature distinct, independent schemes to promote the general goal
of competition. 5 The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the ruling
of the district court, concluding that the conduct alleged by Cava-
lier could not violate the Sherman Act independently of the Tele-
communications Act. 16
B. Sherman Act: Lack of Concerted Action
The Fourth Circuit held that receiving a gift of land with re-
strictive covenants did not violate either the Sherman Act or the
Virginia Civil Conspiracy Act in Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. His-
toric Green Springs, Inc." A dispute arose after W.R. Grace &
Company, owner of vermiculite-laden land in Louisa County, Vir-
ginia, and mining company, Virginia Vermiculite, could not agree
to terms of sale for the land.'" After negotiations failed, W.R.
Grace donated the land to Historic Green Springs, Inc. ("HGSI"),
a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving the Green
10. Id. at 180-81.
11. Id. at 181.
12. Id. at 181-82.
13. Id. at 188.
14. Id. at 189.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 190.
17. 307 F.3d 277, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2002).
18. See id. at 279-80.
20031
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Springs National Historic Landmark District in Louisa County.19
Restrictive covenants on the land grant prohibited its use for
mining or transporting vermiculite. ° Virginia Vermiculite ac-
cused HGSI and W.R. Grace of conspiring to restrain the trade of
Louisa County mining rights, violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act, as well as the Virginia Civil Conspiracy Act.2' Reviewing the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HGSI de
novo,22 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling on different
grounds.
The essence of prohibited conduct under section 1 of the
Sherman Act is concerted action.24 To succeed in such a claim,
the plaintiff must prove that two or more parties "entered into an
illegal, conspiratorial agreement."25 The Supreme Court of the
United States has defined concerted efforts, in light of the Sher-
man Act, to be actions which 'deprive[] the marketplace of the
independent centers of decision making that competition assumes
and demands .... [It] reduces the diverse directions in which
economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic
power moving in one particular direction. [It involves a] merging
of resources.' 26 In the context of gifts, the giving must be genu-
ine; specifically, the giving of the gift can "in no way reflect[] a
merging of the parties' resources, rights, or economic power."27
Parties cannot attempt to disguise the merging of power through
gifts. 28
In this case, the court found no evidence that the gift offered by
W.R. Grace to HGSI was not genuine.29 Additionally, Virginia
Vermiculite had no proof that HGSI combined efforts with W.R.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 280.
21. Id.
22. The district court initially dismissed Virginia Vermiculite's section 1 claim against
W.R. Grace and all claims against HGSI, but on appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded. Id. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to HGSI and
W.R. Grace on all antitrust claims brought against them except for the conspiracy to mo-
nopolize. Id. After W.R. Grace settled and removed itself from the action, the district court
ruled in favor of HGSI on all claims. Id.
23. Id. at 279.
24. Id. at 280.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 281 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
769 (1984) (Burger, C.J.)) (second and third alterations in original).
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Grace to achieve an outcome otherwise impossible due to the two
entities' naturally competing interests." Therefore, section 1 of
the Sherman Act was not violated.31 Because there was no anti-
trust violation, Virginia Vermiculite could not recover under the
Virginia Civil Conspiracy Act.32
C. Foreign Price-Fixing and Its Impact on American Commerce
Two American companies accused nine Southeast Asian rubber
thread manufacturers of price-fixing in Dee-K Enterprises v.
Heveafil Sendirian Berhad.33 The plaintiffs claimed that the
Asian companies forced them to pay "'artificially high and non-
competitive prices' for rubber thread," depriving them "'of free
and open competition in the market[place]."'3 A jury found that,
although there was evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy, the con-
spiracy had no "substantial effect" on this country's commerce."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the use of the substantial
effect standard. Plaintiffs asserted that the standard was used
inappropriately, arguing that it only applies when dealing with
wholly "'foreign conduct,"' and the conspiracy among the nine
Asian manufacturers involved elements of both domestic and for-
eign activity.36 However, the Fourth Circuit found that this case
dealt primarily with foreign conduct, because the majority of the
conduct alleged in the complaint occurred abroad.37 Hence, the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in applying the substantial effect test.
3 8
D. Noerr-Pennington Immunity for Lobbying Efforts
A Fisherman's Best Inc. v. Recreational Fishing Alliance39 arose
out of a dispute in Charleston, South Carolina, over longline fish-
ing and access to a newly built Maritime Center.40 When the
30. Id. at 283.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 284; see also VA.CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
33. 299 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
34. Id. at 284.
35. Id. at 285.
36. Id. at 286.
37. Id. at 285, 295.
38. Id. at 283.
39. 310 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2002).
40. Id. at 187. Longlining involves the use of a floating main line several miles long,
2003]
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Charleston Parks and Recreation Commission selected A Fisher-
man's Best ("AFB") group to operate the new center, public con-
troversy broke out regarding use of the center by longline com-
mercial fishing vessels.4' The Recreational Fishing Alliance
("RFA"), a non-profit organization dedicated to rebuilding and
preserving fisheries in the United States, sent representatives to
Charleston to raise public awareness and lead rallies against the
selection of AFB." After the mayor held a meeting with RFA to
discuss the controversy, the City of Charleston terminated the se-
lection of AFB and sought a declaratory action for the recently
adopted resolution barring service to longline vessels at the Mari-
time Center.43 AFB filed a complaint alleging conspiracy, re-
straint of trade, and interference with competition in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.44
At trial, neither party questioned the existence of antitrust vio-
lations; instead, the litigation focused on whether RFA was ex-
empt from antitrust litigation under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine.4" After examining the various exceptions to the Noerr-
Pennington exemption, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's ruling that RFA was exempt from antitrust litigation.46
The court also dismissed the claims of interference with competi-
tion and conspiracy because RFA's primary purpose was to exer-
cise its First Amendment rights to petition against longliners,
and no other evidence indicated improper purpose.47
with short lines and baited hooks attached at intervals. It is a highly regulated form of
commercial fishing used to harvest migratory species such as swordfish and sharks. Id. at
187 n.1.
41. Id. at 187. AFB proposed serving longline fishing vessels in addition to other
commercial fishing vessels. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see City of Charleston v. A Fisherman's Best, Inc., 310 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.
2002).
44. A Fisherman's Best, 310 F.3d at 188.
45. Id. at 189. The Noerr-Pennington "doctrine states that horizontal competitors may
join together to lobby [the] government because antitrust violations cannot be predicated
on attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws." Id. The First Amendment
shields lobbyists from antitrust liability, even if a successful lobby might eliminate or ex-
clude competitors. Id. See generally United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
46. See A Fisherman's Best, 310 F.3d at 196.
47. See id.
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E. Sherman Act: Carry-On Baggage Templates Not Necessarily
Antitrust Violation
In Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,4" the
Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a district court finding that
baggage template programs at Washington Dulles International
Airport restrained output in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.49 The Fourth Circuit challenged the district court's use of a
"quick-look analysis" in determining whether the Sherman Act
had been violated.5" The court held that a more exhaustive ex-
amination of the factual record is necessary when dealing with
the unique architecture of Dulles Airport and the competitive ef-
fects of baggage templates.51
Many airlines, like United, have adopted baggage templates52
to limit problems associated with carry-on luggage. 3 After ex-
perimenting with templates, Continental decided to take the op-
posite route and expand airplane overhead bins to make room for
the increased demand to carry on luggage.54 The airline's liberal
carry-on policy was a great success.5
This suit arose after the Dulles Airport Management Council
Association voted to allow United, Dulles's primary air carrier, to
install baggage templates at the east security checkpoint.56 Dul-
les's landscape is unique; instead of having a security checkpoint
for one or two common airlines, like most major airports in the
country, Dulles has only two security checkpoints for use by pas-
48. 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
49. See id. at 503.
50. See id. at 508-09, 511. In determining violations of the Sherman Act "[slection 1,
the Supreme Court [of the United States] has authorized three methods of analysis: (1)per
se analysis, for obviously anticompetitive restraints, (2) quick-look analysis, for those with
some procompetitive justification, and (3) the full 'rule of reason' [analysis] for restraints
whose net impact on competition is particularly difficult to determine." Id. at 508-09.
51. See id. at 513.
52. "Baggage templates are pieces of plastic or stainless steel, mounted on hinges,
that cover the mouths of x-ray baggage screening machines" at security checkpoints and
limit the size of luggage that can be carried on to airplanes. Id. at 504.
53. Id. at 504-05. Problems include delays, inconvenience to late-boarding passengers
from full overhead bins, conflicts between the airline staff and passengers, and reduced
safety if carry-on baggage cannot be properly stored. See id.
54. Id. at 505.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 515.
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sengers of its twenty-nine commercial airlines.57 Continental
claimed the installation of baggage templates unreasonably re-
strained trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5"
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court fundamentally
erred in failing to recognize that the parties genuinely disputed
whether a restraint on trade even existed.5 9 Hence, it vacated the
district court holding and remanded the case with instructions to
consider the alleged restraint using a modified quick-look analy-
sis or a rule of reason analysis.60
F. Sherman Act: Conspiracy Theory Rejected by Failure to Show
Market Power
In Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,61 the plaintiffs appealed a federal
district court decision dismissing claims against Microsoft and
three original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs").62 The plain-
tiffs claimed that Microsoft and the OEMs maintained a '"hub-
and-spoke conspiracy"' that restrained trade and violated sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." The Fourth Circuit rejected
the hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory, and instead found the exis-
tence of multiple vertical conspiracies.' Applying the "'full' rule of
reason analysis" to the alleged vertical restraints, the court found
that there was no proof of an unreasonable restraint on trade.65
The plaintiffs failed to show the extent to which Compaq and Dell
held market power, making it impossible to prove that they had
influenced the relevant software markets in an anticompetitive
way through licensing agreements with Microsoft.66 The plaintiffs
also failed to show that the licensing agreement between Micro-
soft and each OEM was the material cause of the alleged anti-
competitive effects in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.67
Similarly, without allegations regarding Dell or Compaq's market
57. Id. at 505.
58. Id. at 507.
59. Id. at 515.
60. Id. at 517.
61. 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002).
62. Id. at 198.
63. Id. at 198-99.
64. Id. at 205.
65. Id. at 205-12.
66. Id. at 210.
67. Id. at 210-11.
[Vol. 38:59
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
power, the plaintiffs were unable to prove a conspiracy to mo-
nopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act.6"
III. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA
A. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia
1. Lanham Act and Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
In Eurotech, Inc. v. Cosmos European Travels Aktiengesell-
schaft,69 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia granted summary judgment awarding an Internet
domain name to the defendant, Cosmos European Travels Akte-
ingesellschaft ("Cosmos").7" Plaintiff Eurotech had sought de-
claratory relief with respect to the domain name cosmos.com.71
Defendant Cosmos asserted counterclaims of trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham
Act, common law unfair competition, and cybersquatting in viola-
tion of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA"). 72
Cosmos was a Lichtenstein corporation that had long used and
promoted the trademarks "Cosmos" and "Cosmos Tourama,"73 and
had registered each in the United States, United Kingdom, Can-
ada, and Australia for the business of selling and "conducting
travel tours."74 Eurotech purchased the domain name cosmos.com
in 1998, but failed to perform a trademark search to determine
whether the "Cosmos" mark was used in connection with another
trademark or trade name.75 Eurotech and its affiliate and co-
plaintiff Eurotech Data Systems Hellas, Ltd. ("Hellas") "pro-
vide[d] consumer and business exchange information and tech-
68. Id. at 211.
69. 213 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Va. 2002).
70. Id. at 626-27.
71. Id. at 618.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 615 n.3.
75. Id. at 614-15.
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nology services via the Internet to various businesses."76 In March
2003, Eurotech changed its name to "CosmoTravels.com, Inc."77
Subsequently, Cosmos filed a complaint with the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization ("WIPO") on July 20, 2001, under
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, asserting a
claim of trademark infringement and seeking an order transfer-
ring ownership of cosmos.com to it.7" The WIPO arbitrator or-
dered the transfer of the cosmos.com domain name to Cosmos,
finding that cosmos.com was "identical or confusingly similar" to
Cosmos's long-standing registered trademarks "Cosmos" and
"Cosmos Tourama"; the evidence suggested that Hellas was com-
monly known as cosmos.com; and the "use of the cosmos.com do-
main name was not legitimate or fair."79 To avoid the transfer,
Eurotech and Hellas filed suit against Cosmos. ° The issues be-
fore the district court for summary judgment arose from this prior
litigation.
The court upheld Cosmos's claim that Eurotech's use of the
term "Cosmos" in connection with the cosmos.com domain name
was an infringement of Cosmos's trademarks in violation of the
Lanham Act.' In short, the court found that Cosmos possessed a
protectible trademark; Eurotech used the trademark; Eurotech
used the trademark "in 'commerce'; Eurotech used the trade-
mark "'in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising' of goods or services"; and Eurotech "used the mark
in a manner likely to confuse consumers." 82 The court likewise
found that Eurotech's unauthorized use of the terms "Cosmos"
and "Cosmos Tourama" created a likelihood of confusion to con-
sumers and held that Cosmos had established all the elements
necessary for a valid unfair competition and trademark infringe-
ment claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a). 3 The court
76. Id. at 614.
77. Id. at 615.
78. Id. at 617.
79. Id. at 617-18. For the district court's opinion on this case, see Eurotech, Inc. v.
Cosmos European Travels Aktiengesellschaft, 189 F. Supp. 2d. 385 (E.D. Va. 2002).
80. Eurotech, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
81. Id. at 626-27.
82. Id. at 619-23 (citations omitted). These factors are set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125(a) (2000) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359,
364 (4th Cir. 2001).
83. Eurotech, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
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lastly agreed that Cosmos had shown that Eurotech's use of cos-
mos.com and other related domain names constituted either
trademark infringement or trademark dilution and that Eurotech
acted in bad faith by intending to profit from use of the "Cosmos"
or "Cosmos Tourama" trademarks in violation of the in personam
provisions of the ACPA."4 Upon these findings, the court ordered
the transfer of the cosmos.com domain name to Cosmos and the
issuance of an injunction against Eurotech's use of the domain
name cosmos.com and other related domain names in United
States commerce. 5
2. Trade Secrets and Noncompete Agreements
In MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 6 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted
the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on a tor-
tious interference claim. 7 The court held that the non-solicitation
clause of MicroStrategy's employment agreement was invalid un-
der Virginia law but that the remainder of the agreement could
be enforced. 8
MicroStrategy alleged that the defendants interfered with its
employment agreement and recruited its employees ("Business
Objects Recruits") in order to gain access to confidential corporate
information. 9 MicroStrategy further alleged that the Business
Objects Recruits violated a section of their employment agree-
ments which stated: "I agree that, for the period of one (1) year
after termination of my employment with MicroStrategy for any
reason, I will not, directly or indirectly, seek to influence any em-
84. Id. at 626. The ACPA imposes civil liability on a person if he or she exhibits a bad
faith intent to profit from the use of a registered trademark and registers, traffics in, or
uses a domain name that:
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title
18 or section 220506 of title 36.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
85. Eurotech, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
86. 233 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2002).
87. Id. at 796.
88. Id. at 795-96.
89. Id. at 791.
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ployees, agents, contractors or customers of MicroStrategy to
terminate or modify their relationship with MicroStrategy.
90
Business Objects argued that the clause was unenforceable be-
cause it was ambiguous and overbroad.9 While the court agreed
with the plaintiff that the clause was not unduly restrictive re-
garding duration, it nevertheless found the non-solicitation clause
invalid because it could restrict a former employee from obtaining
any type of job in the industry due to fear that it might change
that employer's relationship with MicroStrategy.92 Acknowledg-
ing the importance of protecting MicroStrategy's confidential in-
formation, however, the court found that the remainder of the
employment agreement was enforceable under the agreement's
savings clause.93
In Mona Electric Group, Inc. v. Truland Service Corp.,9' a for-
mer employee of Mona Electric Group ("Mona") was hired by Tru-
land Service Corporation ("Truland"), a competing electrical ser-
vice contracting business.9" Mona brought suit against Truland
alleging breach of a non-compete agreement, tortious interference
of contract, and misappropriation of trade secrets.96 The district
court, predicting that the Supreme Court of Virginia would hold
the same way,97 held "that the mere continuation of employment
does not furnish consideration for a non-competition agree-
ment."8 Further, the court held that sheer speculation that the
former employee had utilized Mona's trade secrets in making new
bids was insufficient to survive Truland's motion for summary
judgment.99
Under Virginia law, a claim for tortious interference of contract
must satisfy four elements: (1) a valid contract must exist; (2) the
90. Id. at 794.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 796.
93. Id.
94. 193 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Va. 2002).
95. Id. at 874-75.
96. Id. at 875.
97. Despite this prediction, Mona Electric Group stands in stark contrast to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's opinion in Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va.
171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989), where the court held that continued employment for at-will
employees constituted sufficient consideration for a noncompete agreement. Id. at 176, 380
S.E.2d at 926. The Mona Electric Group opinion does not cite Paramount Termite.
98. Mona Electric, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
99. Id. at 877.
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interferor must have knowledge of the contract; (3) the interfer-
ence inducing the breach of contract must be intentional; and (4)
the breach must have damaged the disrupted party. 00 To satisfy
the first element, existence of a valid contract, the court had to
decide if the contract was supported by adequate consideration.1"'
In this case, the only consideration put forth by the former em-
ployee was his continued employment, which the court found to
be insufficient, thus making the agreement void. °2 In reaching
this decision, the court found it significant that the former em-
ployee had not been informed of any consequences that would re-
sult if he failed to sign the non-solicitation agreement.0 3 The
court qualified its holding by stating that "under the facts of this
case" the former employee's continued employment was inade-
quate consideration.0 4 It remains to be seen whether this holding
will survive beyond these facts, particularly given the holding in
Paramount Termite.'0
The court went on to find that even if the agreement had been
valid, the former employee did not violate it.'0 6 In his position at
Truland, the former employee was responsible, in part, for pre-
paring estimates and handling customer solicitation calls.0 7
However, rather than the former employee seeking out customers
to solicit, he was instead responding to calls that came to Truland
for bids.' As such, this action was not in violation of the non-
solicitation agreement, which would only have been violated had
the former employee actively sought out Mona's customers. 9
Lastly, the court addressed Mona's claim that Truland misap-
propriated trade secrets." 0 Mona's only support for this claim was
100. Id. at 875.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 876. In reaching this decision, the court examined a case decided by the Su-
preme Court of West Virginia where that court applied Virginia law to a contract case. Id.
(citing Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1979)).
103. Id.
104. Id; see also Thomas M. Winn, III, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Labor and Em-
ployment Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 241, 258 (2002) (citing the Mona Electric Group deci-
sion as "[p]erhaps the most controversial decision of the past year in [the] area of [labor
and employment law]").
105. See supra note 97.
106. Mona Electric Group, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
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that the former employee knew Mona's data prior to accepting the
position at Truland, and therefore, must have used that informa-
tion in making and securing new bids at Truland.'1 ' The court
found this "mere speculation" insufficient to survive Truland's
motion for summary judgment.112
B. United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia
1. The Western District Considers Two Cases Involving the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act
In McCaulley v. Purdue Pharma,"' plaintiffs attempted to add
a new defendant, Physician Access, Inc. ("PAI"), to their case, al-
leging violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
("VCPA"), products liability for failure to warn, products liability
for manufacturing defect, breach of warranty, false advertising,
and six other claims related to the promotion and marketing of
OxyContin.'14 This addition, if allowed, would have destroyed di-
versity.115 The clerk of court declined to file the amended com-
plaint without an order of the court.'16
The court found that the timing of the amendment, as it oc-
curred before any discovery was taken, raised a red flag that the
plaintiffs may have been forum shopping.'17 In determining whe-
ther to allow the amendment, the court noted that the plaintiffs'
claims against the new defendant likely were pointless.1 ' The
plaintiffs easily could have learned of PAI's existence earlier if
they had simply reviewed McCaulley's medical records,"1 9 and the
plaintiffs would not suffer injury if the amendment was denied
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 172 F. Supp. 2d 803 (W.D. Va. 2001).
114. Id. at 805.
115. Id. at 806.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 807-08; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-198 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp.
2003) (defining a "supplier" as "a seller, lessor or licensor who advertises, solicits or en-
gages in consumer transactions, or a manufacturer, distributor or licensor who advertises
and sells, leases or licenses goods or services to be resold, leased or sublicensed by other
persons in consumer transactions").
119. McCaulley, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
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because the defendant was insolvent.2 ° The court thus denied
plaintiffs' motion to amend.
121
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia addressed the VCPA again in Pitchford v. Oakwood Mo-
bile Homes, 122 and denied the plaintiffs motion for an award of at-
torneys' fees and expenses. 123 In that case, Kimberly R. Pitchford
contracted to purchase a mobile home, but following its receipt,
alleged that it had major defects and structural problems.'24 In an
effort to cancel the purchase contract and recover monetary dam-
ages, Pitchford initiated an action to recover for alleged breaches
of warranties, violations of the VCPA, violations of the Magnu-
son-Moss Act, and fraud.
125
The parties later reached a settlement, but failed to resolve the
issues of expenses and attorneys' fees. 126 They agreed to a settle-
ment conference before a magistrate judge who recommended
that Pitchford be awarded attorneys' fees and costs in excess of
$50,000.127 The defendants objected. 2 '
The district court first ruled that Pitchford was not a prevailing
party and therefore was not entitled to attorneys' fees under the
Magnuson-Moss Act.'29 Citing Buckhannon Board & Care Home
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Re-
sources,30 the court found that Pitchford was not a prevailing
party because the case was settled and dismissed without a final
judgment on the merits.'3 ' Further, Pitchford did not obtain pre-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 810.
122. 212 F. Supp. 2d 613 (W.D. Va. 2002).
123. Id. at 621.
124. Id. at 614-15.
125. Id. at 615. Parties are usually responsible for their own litigation expenses. How-
ever, there are exceptions under which Congress has awarded attorneys' fees to the pre-
vailing party. One such exception applies to a consumer who "finally prevails" under the
Magnuson-Moss Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2000). The Act provides for payment of costs
and expenses, including attorneys' fees that the court determines "to have been reasonably
incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with commencement and prosecution of' the
case. Id.
126. Pitchford, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 616-18.
130. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
131. Pitchford, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 615-19.
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vailing party status through reaching a private settlement with
Oakwood, because "[a] party may not prevail for purposes of a fee
shifting provision by virtue of a private settlement agreement
alone."'32 The court noted that Pitchford may have been success-
ful if terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of an
enforceable court order.
133
The court also found that Pitchford was not entitled to attor-
neys' fees under the VCPA."' Using an analysis similar to the
analysis in Buckhannon, the court ruled that the VCPA allows for
recovery of attorneys' fees only by a plaintiff who has finally pre-
vailed on the merits of a VCPA claim and has been "awarded"
damages.'35 The district court found that the use of the term
"award" should be interpreted so that a judgment on the merits
must be determined before attorneys' fees can be awarded. 136
2. Conspiracy Against Chiropractors Rejected Again
The largest managed healthcare company in Virginia success-
fully defended itself against claims of anticompetitive activity in
American Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.137 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for Trigon, finding that no
issues of material fact existed as to claims that the healthcare
company conspired to restrict their insureds' access to chiroprac-
tors. 3 ' After naming medical doctors on Trigon's Managed Care
Advisory Panel as primary co-conspirators, the plaintiffs failed to
show proof of a concerted action as required for a claim under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. 39 The intracorporate immunity doc-
trine bars claims of conspiracy between a corporation and its em-
ployees or agents, absent any independent personal stake in
achieving the corporation's illegal objective. 4 ° In this case, Trigon
132. Id. at 618; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 ("A defendant's voluntary change
in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the
lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the charge.").
133. Pitchford, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20.
134. Id. at 621.
135. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
136. Pitchford, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
137. 258 F. Supp. 2d 461 (W.D. Va. 2003).
138. Id. at 463.
139. Id. at 464, 465.
140. The doctrine of intracorporate immunity holds that '"a corporation cannot conspire
with itself.'" Id. at 464 (quoting Am. Chiropractic Ass'n Inc. v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 151
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board members and employees were not engaged in the private
practice of medicine, always acted in the company's best interest,
and obtained no personal benefit from Trigon's decisions regard-
ing chiropractors."' Furthermore, there was no evidence to show
that panel members competed with chiropractors and thus would
gain any economic benefit from anticompetitive activity. 4 2 Nor
was there any evidence that any of the defendants fell within the
independent personal stake exception.4 3 The Managed Care Ad-
visory Panel has no decision-making authority, but merely acts as
an advisory board to Trigon.'44 Thus, the Sherman Act section 1
claim of conspiracy between Trigon and its panel was barred by
the intracorporate immunity doctrine.'45
All other claims of conspiracy failed due to lack of evidence.'46
The court reasoned that any restraint on utilizatibn of chiroprac-
tors by subscribers would not make economic sense.'47 Plaintiffs
asserted that chiropractors provide cheaper and more effective
remedies to neuromuscular disorders. 4 As a profit-seeking en-
tity, it would be economically advantageous for Trigon to encour-
age use of chiropractors. 4 9 Furthermore, statistics indicate an in-
creased use of chiropractics by Trigon subscribers, such that from
1996 to 2001 the number of chiropractors in Trigon's provider
networks doubled, the number of insureds receiving chiropractic
manipulations nearly tripled, and chiropractors' share of Trigon's
total payments to health care providers increased by fourteen
percent. 5 °
F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (W.D. Va. 2001)). "A corporation cannot conspire with its employees
or agents because 'the officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing
separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together
economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals.'" Id. at 464-65 (quoting
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)).
141. Id. at 465.
142. Id.
143. Id. See Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 1991) and
Greenville Publ'g Co. v. The Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1974) for
an explanation of the independent state exception.
144. Am. Chiropractic Ass'n, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
145. See id. at 464.
146. Id. at 466 n.8.
147. Id. at 466.
148. Id. at 466-67.
149. Id. at 466.
150. Id. at 468.
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Similarly, a lack of evidence of concerted action prevented a
conspiracy to monopolize claim against Trigon under section 2 of
the Sherman Act.'51 As regards attempted monopolization, plain-
tiffs must prove specific intent to monopolize a relevant market
through predatory or anticompetitive acts, with a dangerous
probability of success in achieving monopolization. 5 2 Following
White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd.,"' the court likewise re-
jected the attempted monopolization claim, finding that "Trigon
and chiropractors do not compete in the same market."'54
IV. COURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
A. Supreme Court of Virginia: Liberal Protection Afforded Under
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Supreme Court of Virginia more clearly articulated the pa-
rameters of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in Titan America,
L.L.C. v. Riverton Investment Corp.5' Titan initiated a lawsuit
against Riverton alleging tortious interference with existing and
potential economic relationships. 5 6 Titan, a cement company,
sought to secure land in Warren County, Virginia, for use as a
warehousing and distributing center.157 Riverton, which also pro-
duces cement, placed various roadblocks in Titan's path in an at-
tempt to thwart Titan's acquisition of the property: Riverton ap-
peared before the local board of zoning appeals and the planning
commission, brought suit in circuit court, and funded litigation
efforts against Titan brought by residents of Warren County.' 8
Nevertheless, Titan eventually succeeded in purchasing the con-
troversial property.'59
Riverton asserted that Titan's claims were barred by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.6 ° The trial court concurred, holding that, al-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987).
154. Am. Chiropractic Ass'n, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
155. 264 Va. 292, 569 S.E.2d 57 (2002).
156. Id. at 296, 569 S.E.2d at 59.
157. Id. at 296, 569 S.E.2d at 58.
158. Id. at 296, 569 S.E.2d at 59.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 300, 569 S.E.2d at 61.
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though Riverton employed the use of straw persons, such usage
did not amount to sham litigation; thus, Riverton's actions did not
fall within the doctrine's exception.'61 The trial court dismissed
Titan's claims against Riverton.
162
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Titan's con-
tention that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply to its
claims, holding that causes of action for tortious interference with
business expectancy and conspiracy "fall[] squarely within the
constitutional protections recognized by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine."'63 Moreover, the supreme court held that the trial court
applied the proper test, as announced in Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,164 in deter-
mining whether Riverton's litigation was a mere sham. 6 5 Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors necessitates a two-part inquiry.16
6
First, the reviewing court must ascertain whether the litigation is
objectively baseless. 67 If so, the court then makes a subjective in-
quiry to determine whether there exists an anticompetitive pur-
pose behind the lawsuit.'68 As the trial court concluded that the
claims were not objectively baseless, it did not conduct the second
inquiry.'69 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's applica-
tion of the two-prong test set forth in Professional Real Estate In-
vestors. 1
70
The supreme court also rejected Titan's argument that River-
ton did not have standing to invoke the doctrine's protection be-
cause only those who are parties to the underlying litigation are
entitled to its protection.' 7 ' Citing the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baltimore Scrap Corp. v.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 296, 569 S.E.2d at 59.
163. Id. at 302, 569 S.E.2d at 62.
164. 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
165. Titan America, L.L.C., 264 Va. at 302-03, 569 S.E.2d at 62-63.
166. Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60-61.
167. Id. Under this inquiry, a claim is objectively baseless if he who asserted the claim
did not have probable cause to initiate an unsuccessful suit, probable cause being "'rea-
sonabl[e] belie[fl that there is a chance that [a] claim may be held valid upon adjudica-
tion."' Id. at 62-63 (quoting Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 178 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1961))
(alterations in original).
168. Id.
169. Titan America L.L.C., 264 Va. at 302, 569 S.E.2d at 62.
170. Id. at 303, 569 S.E.2d at 63.
171. Id. at 303-05, 569 S.E.2d at 63-64.
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David J. Joseph Co.,172 which held that the doctrine's protection
will be afforded to a non-party who funded litigation,173 the su-
preme court concluded that Riverton's financing of litigation did
not serve as a bar to the doctrine's application.174
B. Franchising: A Hotbed of Legal Activity
In Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Quillian,175 the Supreme
Court of Virginia accepted the certification of questions of law
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. 176 The district court sought the supreme court's inter-
pretation of a portion of the Motor Vehicle Code, Virginia Code
section 46.2-1993.67(5), in order to adjudicate Yamaha's claim
that the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicle's in-
terpretation and enforcement of the section violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
77
Yamaha sought to establish a new franchise with a dealer in
Rosedale, Virginia, who also sold Suzuki-brand motorcycles.
1 7 1
Pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code, Yamaha notified all of the
existing Yamaha dealers in the Commonwealth, including Atlas,
another motorcycle dealer, of its proposed new dealership. 179 At-
las protested the establishment to the Commissioner.8 0 Yamaha
claimed that Atlas lacked standing to protest because it was lo-
cated outside of the "market area" referred to in the code provi-
sion."'
172. 237 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2001).
173. Id. at 401.
174. Titan America, L.L.C., 264 Va. at 304-05, 569 S.E.2d at 64.
175. 264 Va. 656, 571 S.E.2d 122 (2002). For additional discussion of Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A, see James R. Kibler, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Administrative
Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 39, 53 (2003).
176. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 264 Va. at 659-60, 571 S.E.2d at 123-24.
177. Id. Yamaha contended that the Commissioner's actions "unduly interfere[] with
[its] rights to engage in interstate commerce, restrain[] the establishment of new busi-
nesses and employment opportunities in Virginia, and deprive] Virginia consumers of the
benefits of lawful intrabrand competition."' Id. at 659, 571 S.E.2d at 123 (second alteration
in original).
178. Id. at 661, 571 S.E.2d at 124.
179. Id. at 661-62, 571 S.E.2d at 125.
180. Id. at 662, 571 S.E.2d at 125.
181. Id.
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The supreme court inquired as to the General Assembly's in-
tent in promulgating the specific provision.1 12 The statute was
found not to be sufficiently explicit as to whether any existing
dealer of motorcycles within the Commonwealth may protest the
establishment of another dealership.8 3 The court found that the
purpose of the provision was to provide additional protection to
motorcycle dealers located anywhere within the Common-
wealth.' Thus, Atlas had standing to protest Yamaha's estab-
lishment of a new dealership.8 5
Moreover, the court held that the Commissioner accurately in-
terpreted the provision to afford evidentiary hearings only to
those existing dealers who show they are representing the same
brand of motorcycles in the county, city, or town of the proposed
new dealership.8 6 Finally, the court determined that, under the
provision, the manufacturer need not prove inadequate represen-
tation throughout Virginia, and that proof should not be limited
to the county, city, or town in which the proposed dealership
would be located.18
7
The Fairfax County Circuit Court addressed franchising issues
in Kirin Brewery of America, L.L.C. v. Virginia Imports, Ltd.'
The Virginia Beer Franchising Act 8 9 ("Act") governed a distribu-
torship agreement between Kirin and Virginia Imports. 9 °
On August 3, 1999, Kirin notified Virginia Imports of its intent
to terminate the franchise under the terms of the Act.'9 ' Virginia
Imports responded to Kirin's notification with a letter stating its
intent to cure the deficiencies of which Kirin complained.'92 How-
ever, Virginia Imports did not forward the letter to the Virginia
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, as required by section 4.1-506
of the Act, nor did they request a hearing before the Board on
182. Id. at 665, 571 S.E.2d at 127.
183. See id. at 665-66, 571 S.E.2d at 127.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 667, 571 S.E. 2d at 127.
186. See id. at 666, 571 S.E. 2d at 127.
187. Id.
188. 60 Va. Cir. 151 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Fairfax County). For additional discussion of
Kirin, see Kibler, supra note 175, at 55.
189. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-500 to -517 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cur. Supp. 2003).
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Kirin's reasonable cause to terminate the agreement.193 Conse-
quently, on February 9, 2000, the Secretary of the Board in-
formed Kirin that the agreement had terminated under the terms
of the Act, due to Virginia Imports' inaction.194 Kirin then desig-
nated a new Virginia distributor, Anheuser-Busch, Inc.'95
Upon Virginia Imports' protest, the Secretary ordered a hear-
ing on the matter.1 96 The hearing panel concluded that Kirin had
acted in bad faith and that, as a result, there could not be good
cause to terminate the distributorship agreement. 197 In its Final
Order, the Board held that Kirin lacked the good cause necessary
to terminate the agreement and, therefore, the agreement re-
mained viable.' 9
Kirin appealed the Board's order, 99 and the circuit court set
out to determine whether the Board possessed the authority to
render that decision, as Virginia Imports neglected both to notify
the Board of its intent to rectify its defective performance and to
request a hearing as to the legitimacy of Kirin's good cause.2 °° The
circuit court held that Kirin's reliance on the Secretary's letter
was reasonable and did not constitute bad faith, that the Board
did not have the authority to review the matter, that the distribu-
torship agreement did terminate by the terms of the Act, and, fi-
nally, that Kirin would have had good cause to terminate the
agreement, if necessary.20 '
C. Fiduciary Duty and Non-Competition Issues in Virginia
In Williams v. Dominion Technology Partners, L.L.C.,2°2 the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the trial court
erred in entering judgment on the verdict in favor of an employer
against a former at-will employee for an alleged breach of fiduci-
193. Id. at 152-53.




198. Id. at 154.
199. See id. at 157.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 157-58.
202. 265 Va. 280, 576 S.E.2d 752 (2003).
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ary duty, tortious interference with a business relationship, and
business conspiracy. °3
Dominion recruited Williams as an at-will employee to fill a
computer consultant position at Stihl, Inc., a power tool manufac-
turing company. 2°  ACSYS Information Technology, Inc.
("ACSYS") entered into an agreement with Stihl to employ Wil-
liams, and subsequently entered into another contract with Do-
minion for Williams's services. °5 The latter contract did not pro-
hibit ACSYS from recruiting or directly employing Dominion's
employees. °6 Per the two contracts, ACSYS received $165 for
each hour Williams worked, and Dominion charged ACSYS $115
an hour. Williams then received eighty dollars an hour from Do-
minion. Upon learning of this payment system, Williams opted
to terminate his at-will employment with Dominion in favor of
working for Stihl directly through ACSYS. 2°" He eventually con-
tracted with ACSYS to receive $115 per hour.20 9
The court noted that the common law imposes a fiduciary duty
of loyalty on behalf of employees, including employees-at-will, to-
wards their employers. 210 This duty also forbids employees from
competing with their employers during the course of employ-
ment.211 However, an employee may arrange to compete with his
employer after resigning, barring any contractual restrictions re-
lating to the duty of loyalty.212 The court advised that "the law
will not provide relief to every 'disgruntled player in the rough-
and-tumble world comprising the competitive marketplace,' espe-
cially where, through more prudent business practices, the harm
complained of could easily have been avoided."213
The court determined that Williams's effort to safeguard his
own interests did not amount to disloyalty or unfairness so far as
203. Id. at 283, 576 S.E.2d at 753.
204. Id. at 283-84, 576 S.E.2d at 753.
205. Id. at 284, 576 S.E.2d at 754.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 285, 576 S.E.2d at 754.
208. Id. at 285-87, 576 S.E.2d at 754-55.
209. Id. at 287, 576 S.E.2d at 756.
210. Id. at 289, 576 S.E.2d at 757.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 290-91, 576 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting ITT Hartford Group, Inc. v. Va. Fin. As-
socs., Inc., 258 Va. 193, 204, 520 S.E.2d 355, 361 (1999)).
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Dominion was concerned.214 Likewise, Williams's conduct did not
rob Dominion of business opportunity or expectancy.215 Thus, the
court held that Williams's conduct did not constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty.216 As the other allegations were predicated upon
this determination, the court reversed the trial court's judgment
for Dominion and entered final judgment in favor of Williams.2 7
In Modern Environments, Inc. v. Stinnett,218 the Supreme Court
of Virginia continued its recent trend of refusing to enforce re-
strictive covenants within employment agreements.21 9 Stinnett
worked for Modern Environments for five years and then signed
an employment agreement that contained a one-year non-
competition clause.22° Within one year of her departure from the
company, she accepted employment with a competitor.22' Modern
Environments threatened legal action against Stinnett, who, in
turn, sought declaratory judgment that the noncompete provi-
sions were unenforceable on the grounds that they were over-
broad and contrary to public policy.
222
The court noted that the noncompete clause at issue did not al-
low the former employee to "directly or indirectly, own, manage,
operate, control, be employed by, participate in or be associated in
any manner" with a competing business.223 This language pre-
vented the employee from working in any capacity for a competi-
tor. The court found this language to be overbroad because Mod-
ern Environments offered no evidence that the restriction was
"'reasonable and no greater than necessary to protect Modern's
legitimate business interests.' 2 4
214. Id. at 292, 576 S.E.2d at 758.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 292, 576 S.E.2d at 759.
217. Id.
218. 263 Va. 491, 561 S.E.2d 694 (2002).
219. Id. at 493, 561 S.E.2d at 695 (stating that "covenants in restraint of trade are not
favored, will be strictly construed, and, in the event of ambiguity, will be construed in fa-
vor of the employee"); see, e.g., Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 262 Va. 33, 546 S.E.2d
424 (2001); Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001).
220. Modern Env'ts, Inc., 263 Va. at 492-93, 561 S.E.2d at 694.
221. Id. at 493, 561 S.E.2d at 694.
222. Id. at 493, 561 S.E.2d at 695.
223. Id. 493-94, 561 S.E.2d at 695 (emphasis removed).
224. Id. at 495, 561 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Modern's brief).
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V. NEW LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2001225
The Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2001 amended the Im-
proving America's Schools Act of 1994.226 The Improving Amer-
ica's Schools Act granted private universities only a temporary
exemption from antitrust laws,227 and allowed them to use com-
mon principles and agree in the awarding of need-based financial
aid to students admitted to more than one member of the
group.22 8 It allowed agreements to provide aid on the basis of
need only, to use common principles of need analysis, to use a
common financial aid application form, and to allow the exchange
of the students' financial information through a third party.229
The Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2001 extends this exemp-
tion under antitrust laws through 2008 for the award of need-
based educational aid.23°
B. Medical Malpractice Insurance Antitrust Act of 2003231
The Medical Malpractice Insurance Antitrust Act of 2003 modi-
fies the McCarran-Ferguson Act 232 with respect to medical mal-
practice insurance.233 The Act prohibits commercial insurers from
engaging in price-fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations to the
detriment of competition and consumers. 23 '4 The goal of the bill is
to limit the broad exemption to federal antitrust law and promote
competition in the insurance industry.235
225. Pub. L. No. 107-72, 115 Stat. 648.
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
227. Id.
228. 147 CONG. REC. H7731 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensonbrenner).
229. Id.; see also 147 CONG. REC. H1360-62 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Sensonbrenner).
230. Pub. L. No. 107-72, § 2, 115 Stat. 648.
231. S. 352, 108th Cong. (2003). Introduced to the United States Senate on February
11, 2003, this bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See 149 CONG.
REC. S2187 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2003). For further discussion of the current malpractice in-
surance issues in Virginia, see Kathleen M. McCauley, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Health Care Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 137, 157 (2003).
232. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945).
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C. Health Care Antitrust Improvements Act of 2003236
The Health Care Antitrust Improvements Act of 2003 seeks to
clarify the application of antitrust laws to negotiations between
health care professionals, health plans, and health care insurance
providers.237 It requires application of the rule of reason standard
to negotiations between a health plan and two or more physi-
cians,23' and awards attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff in cer-
tain actions when the defendant's conduct was unreasonable or in
bad faith.239 It prohibits tying arrangements between a health
plan and health care professionals, except as specified. 240 Negotia-
tions or agreements between health care professionals and health
plans dealing with benefits under federal programs (e.g., Medi-
care, Medicaid, etc.) are excluded from this Act.241
D. Drug Competition Act of 2003242
The purpose of the Drug Competition Act of 2003 is to enhance
competition for prescription drugs by increasing the ability of the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to enforce
existing antitrust laws regarding brand name drugs and generic
drugs.243 This bill sets filing requirements for agreements made
before a drug enters the market between generic drug applicants
that have submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application and
brand name drug companies. 2' These agreements must be filed
with the assistant attorney general and the Federal Trade Com-
mission.14' However, agreements that solely concern purchase or-
236. H.R. 1120, 108th Cong. (2003). Introduced into the United States House of Repre-
sentatives on March 6, 2003, this bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judici-
ary. See 149 CONG. REC. H1679 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003). For a more thorough discussion of
health care law in Virginia, see McCauley, supra, note 231, at 137.
237. H.R. 1120, 108th Cong. (2003).
238. Id. at § 2.
239. Id. at § 3.
240. Id. at § 5.
241. Id. at § 6.
242. S. 946, 108th Cong. (2003). Introduced to the United States Senate on April 29,
2003, this bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See 149 CONG. REC.
S5493 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2003).
243. S. 946, 108th Cong. (2003).
244. Id. at § 5(b).
245. Id.
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ders for raw materials, equipment and facility contracts, or em-
ployment contracts are excepted from these regulations.246
E. Medical Liability Insurance Crisis Response Act of 2003247
The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis Response Act of 2003
aims:
to modify the antitrust exemption applicable to the business of medi-
cal malpractice insurance, to address current issues for health care
providers, to reform medical malpractice litigation by making avail-
able alternative dispute resolution methods, requiring plaintiffs to
submit affidavits of merit before proceeding, and enabling judgments
to be satisfied through periodic payments, [and] to reform the medi-
cal malpractice insurance market.
2 4 8
This bill would amend the McCarran-Ferguson Act by exempt-
ing from antitrust laws conduct that consists of making an
agreement for a certain purpose pertaining to the provision of
medical malpractice insurance.249 It would also amend the Public
Health Service Act,2"' the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974,251 and the Internal Revenue Code to provide for the
prompt payment of claims.25 2
F. Antitrust Improvement Acts of 2003213
The Antitrust Improvement Act of 2003 would update the
criminal penalties applicable to antitrust criminal violations and
repeal Title VIII of the Antidumping Act of 1916.254 In addition, it
246. Id. at § 5(b)(1).
247. H.R. 1158, 108th Cong. (2003). This bill was introduced into the United States
House of Representatives on March 6, 2003. See 149 CONG. REC. H1680 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
2003).
248. 149 CONG. REC. H1680 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003); see also H.R. 1158, 108th Cong.
(2003).
249. H.R. 1158, 108th Cong. § 103 (2003).
250. Id. at § 201(a)(1).
251. Id. at § 201(a)(2).
252. Id. at § 291(a)(3).
253. S. 1080, 108th Cong. (2003). This bill was introduced to the United States Senate
on May 19, 2003, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. See 149 CONG. REC.
S6624 (daily ed. May 19, 2003).
254. 149 CONG. REC. S6631 (daily ed. May 19, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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seeks to raise the maximum punishment for an individual to ten
years imprisonment.2 5 The proposal also raises the maximum
fines applicable to corporations and other legal entities from ten
million dollars to one hundred million dollars per violation.256 All
criminal fines would be paid into a victims fund, to be adminis-
tered by the Justice Department, and ultimately disbursed to
support victims advocacy groups.25 7 Criminals who have assets
would first pay restitution to any identifiable victims to compen-
sate them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and the federal and state courts of Virginia have consid-
ered a number of antitrust and trade regulation cases over the
past two years, none has significantly changed the landscape of
antitrust law in Virginia. It remains a daunting challenge to be
an antitrust plaintiff in the Commonwealth. Further, as evi-
denced by the string of decisions striking down noncompete
clauses, the mindset of the Supreme Court of Virginia towards
litigation involving businesses and their former employees as new
competitors has taken a decidedly chilly tone, as reflected in Do-
minion Technology Partners, where the court expressed its pref-




257. Id. at S6631-32.
258. Id. at S6632.
259. See supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
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